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ABSTRACT
This paper aims at understanding the impact of Bulgarian politics and policy in energy 
relations between the EU and Russia. Chiefly, our case analysis focuses on the prospec-
tive construction of new nuclear facilities and its impact on the Black Sea region, within 
the European Union, and on the relations between Sofia, Brussels, and Moscow.
The first part of this work is dedicated to outlining the most significant direction of the 
research: nuclear energy in Bulgaria. In the second part, a brief historical context of the 
Bulgaria-EU negotiations precedes a section that analyses the current Sofia-Brussels 
energy dialogue, from accession (2007) onward. The last analytical part delineates Bul-
garia as a vertex in the framework of Russia-EU relations. The Bulgarian energy complex 
is seen as a strategic hub for prospective pipelines, but also an important market that 
could be used to exert influence in the Black Sea region as well. Bulgaria might be con-
sidered a strategic centre for regional and international energy cooperation.
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introduction
When dealing with energy issues, the degree of academic solidity in case 
analyses is at stake. Few catch-phrases would surely grant a high return on 
the circulation of Political Science and Economics papers, though under-
mining the overall scientific depth of the arguments. In this paper we chose 
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to look at the hot topic of “energy security” with respect to the Bulgarian 
nuclear sector from an institutionalist point of view, with a strong empha-
sis on the historic relevance of  technical and economic data. Through the 
years, the Bulgarian case has become a paragon for the analysis of EU-Rus-
sia energy relations and shows interesting aspects also in Sofia’s interaction 
with Brussels and Moscow. For this reason, the present paper looks at Bul-
garia from a detached point of view, trying to tie history, politics, and eco-
nomics with technical, legal, and environmental concerns. In our opinion, 
all of these aspects, must be taken seriously to reach a deep understanding 
of the salience of today’s Bulgarian nuclear sector. Nuclear energy in Bul-
garia is not just a source of electricity for households in Sofia; it bundles to-
gether the European Union’s membership (and energy policy) and Russian 
economic interests. These elements come together on the Bulgarian field to 
wage an important tug-of-war over energy and beyond.
The analysis is carried through the lens of Neo-Institutionalism. The chief 
assumption is that institutions matter and they are susceptible to analyze. 
Energy studies require a cross-sectorial analysis and Historical Instutional-
ism2 is the most suitable approach (Pierson, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Campbell, 2004), especially when taking into consideration the Bulgar-
ian political and economic history not only as a sequence of independent 
events, but as an explanatory variable. Throughout the paper, energy is con-
sidered as a puzzle, in accordance with the definition by Pierson: 
Historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are 
inherently of interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. To 
develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or puz-
zles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying se-
quences and tracing transformations and processes of varying scale 
and temporality. Historical institutionalists likewise analyze macro 
contexts and hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions 
and processes rather than examining just one institution or process 
at a time. Taken together, these three features – substantive agendas; 
temporal arguments; and attention to contexts and configurations -- 
add up to a recognizable historical institutional approach that makes 
powerful contributions to our discipline’s understandings of govern-
ment, politics, and public policies.3
2 See also: Immergut (1998); Hall and Taylor (1996); Katzenstein (1976); North (1990); Rothstein 
(1996); Thelen (1999); 
3 Pierson (1993).
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After the introductory overview on the Bulgarian energy mix and the rele-
vance of nuclear energy, which defines the subject of the research, the paper 
focuses on the historical role of the nuclear sector in Bulgarian energy poli-
cy and politics both during the Soviet era and after 1991. The elaboration of 
the concept of path dependency in its declination as path dependency4  offers 
the theoretical explanation.
The second section is dedicated to the negotiations between Brussels and 
Sofia. Softening the Neorealist (Waltz, 1976) assumption of State as unitary 
actors (Keohane, 1986; Vasquez, 1998), the analytical focus shifts to na-
tional and international institutions. In this respect, institutions are defined 
as “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political econo-
my” (Hall, 1996)5.  
Taking into account this theoretical choice, the third part investigates the 
dynamics animating the triangle Moscow-Sofia-Brussels, drawing from 
the two-level game theory (Putnam, 1989), to study both the international-
European pressure and domestic level, considering policy outcomes as the 
result of “double edged diplomacy” (Evans, Jacobson, Putnam 1993).
Bulgarian EnErgy ovErviEW
The Bulgarian energy mix is based on two interrelated pillars: the scarcity 
of indigenous resources and the dominance of fossil fuels. Bulgaria imports 
almost all fossil fuels it consumes6 and chooses to satisfy domestic energy 
demand with coal, oil and nuclear energy, using imported gas for exports. 
The relationship between economic growth and energy demand reveals a 
great inefficiency. In spite of a low GDP7 and a decreasing population, en-
ergy consumption increases, contrasting with the general rule about the 
nexus between the two macro-economic indicators. The current economic 
crisis negatively affects this feature.
4 “A process is phat-dependent if the outcome in any period depends on the set of outcomes and 
opportunities that arose in a history but not upon their order. A phat-dependent process can be written 
as follows: xt+1 =Gt({ht})” (Sage, 2006).
5 See also: Ikenberry, 1988; Steinmo, 2008. 
6 Bulgaria imports almost 76,2% of fossil fuels used to satisfy its domestic consumption.(IEA, 2010). 
7 In 2010, Bulgarians had the lowest GDP in the European Union, with 4,800 € per inhabitant against a 
EU average of 25,786 € per inhabitant (Eurostat, 2011)
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Figure 1- Energy intensity, 20108
Source: Elaboration on Eurostat data, 2011
Figure 2- Energy mix, 2010
Source: Elaboration on Bp Statistical, 2011.
After the dissolution of the USSR, Bulgaria experienced relevant and cycli-
cal economic crises. The worst one took place in 1996-1997 and it involved 
the banking sector and currency in particular. It represented a first minor 
8 Energy intensity measures the ratio of energy use to output. Bulgaria has the highest in EU, both 
compared with the EU average and other CEECs Member States with similar energy systems. 
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stage towards lowering the degree of energy intensity in the country, which 
remains higher than Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) and 
EU-27 average (see Figure 1). In 2010, the primary energy consumption 
was satisfied mainly by fossil fuels: coal (36.1%) and oil (22.8%). Nuclear 
accounts for 19.2%, more than natural gas (12.5%), mainly used to export. 
The renewable energy sources covers only the 7.2% (see Figure 2).
With such scenario in mind, our next step is to describe in depth the history 
of the development of nuclear energy in Bulgaria, from its origins in the 
Thirties onwards. The subsequent paragraph takes on the issue of the two-
level game played by Sofia with Brussels and the EU institutions. The last 
section analyses the policy triangle that connects the decision-making pro-
cess in Sofia, Moscow, and Brussels whose actions are mutually influenced. 
thE soviEt and russian factor in Bulgaria
1. History and Development of Bulgarian Nuclear Industry
At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union began introducing eco-
nomic development programs in the countries that were drawn under its 
control. In the period between Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s speech at 
the XX Congress of the CPSU, Todor Zhivkov rose to power in Bulgaria9. 
The Soviet establishment would work with Zhivkov until the very last days 
of existence of the Eastern Bloc.
In this political environment, Bulgaria was eyed by Soviet leaders as a key 
country for the development of the nuclear energy industry. Planned in 
Bulgaria’s official Energy Strategy documents since 1956, the first research 
reactors were started in 1961 in Kozloduy10. This site by the Danube river 
on the north-eastern border between Bulgaria and Romania. Based on the 
agreement between Sofia and Moscow signed in July 1966, the two govern-
ments put on the table a detailed development and investment plan for the 
nuclear industry in Bulgaria (Ginsburgs and Slusser, 1981). Once the fea-
sibility study was completed by a joint team of engineers11, the building of 
the plant’s four main reactors started in 1969.
9 In particular, Zhivkov sided with the anti-Stalinist factions and became the Secretary General of the 
BKP (Bulgarian Communist Party). It is worth noting that Bulgaria was part of the Warsaw Pact, signed 
in 1955 in response to the birth of NATO. 
10 A Soviet-built standard IRT-2000 reactor with a 2MW nameplate capacity.
11 The team is jointly coordinated from the research institutes of Moscow, Toploproekt, and Sofia, 
Energoproekt http://www.aep.ru/en/activity/projects/abroad/kozloduy
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The first two units of the Kozloduy NPP were quickly completed by 1974, 
running on VVER-440 reactors (their capacity was in fact 440 MW), and 
their commercial delivery began in July 1974 and November 1975 respec-
tively. This was the first stage of the development of the Kozloduy site. It 
overlapped with the second stage, as the construction of Unit 3 and 4 start-
ed in 1973. These reactors were completed by 1980 and 1982 respectively, 
and had improved safety and efficiency technology by implementing the 
enhanced V-230 model.
For the third stage of development, two additional units were commis-
sioned in addition to the existing four. The construction was completed in 
1988 and 1993 respectively, employing advanced technology for concrete 
containing – not present in the V-230 model – and envisioning a waste stor-
age facility, to be considered ad interim, before waste was shipped abroad. 
The newer reactors are VVER-100012, their model being the V-32013. All of 
the Kozloduy reactors can therefore be considered of second generation, 
taking into account the various steps that nuclear technology has under-
gone worldwide.
Uranium mining in Bulgaria has been carried out since the discovery of a 
few sites by German and Russian ventures in the late-Thirties and early-
Forties. The mines were located along the Balkan Mountains (Eleshnitsa, 
Buhovo) and in Northern Thrace (Asenovgrad and Senokos, Smitli). How-
ever, a governmental decision made in 1992 halted all explorations and 
mining for uranium in Bulgaria. Following the obsolence of the Warsaw 
Pact, the Russian Federation lost interest in bartering Bulgarian yellow cake 
with enhanced fuel rods.
In the years, remodeling work has been applied to the older reactors at 
Kozloduy NPP. However, not complying with post-Chernobyl security 
standards, most of the Soviet-style reactors in Eastern Europe were strictly 
monitored by the European Union. This is particularly true for countries 
that submitted their application for becoming a member of the EU. Bul-
garia was no exception, as it had to comply with dire requirements during 
the application process as shown below in chapter 3.
12 With a capacity of 1,000 MW.
13 The Vodo-Vodyanoi Energeticheskii Reaktor, VVER, is a type of reactor that represented the Soviet 
response to Western-designed Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). VVERs use water for during fuel 
processing for both cooling and retrieving thermal energy. For this reason, reactors that use “light 
water” are built near a source of water, typically a river. In Bulgaria, the Danube has been chosen as 
the ideal stream for the exploitation of hydroresources, especially with regards to nuclear energy. These 
types of reactors also require the lowest level of uranium enrichment. Through Soviet technology, 
uranium was produced to yellow cake levels, which made the reactors sustainable in the long term.
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2. The Second NPP
Studies for the construction of a second NPP were assigned to Energo-
proekt in the Seventies. Once these were completed, in 1981 the Bulgarian 
government headed by Zhivkov decided the construction of a NPP near 
the town of Belene, 200 km east of Kozloduy, by the Danube banks like the 
previous one. Construction of the basic features of a nuclear facility were 
started the same year following the project by Energoproekt. For the con-
struction of the power plant, a joint design by Atomenergoproekt (Ukraine 
SSR) and its Bulgarian counterpart was laid out. It envisioned the building 
of a VVER-1000 V-320 reactor, the very same that were being assembled in 
Kozloduy’s fifth and sixth module.
Politics and science wrote together the ill-fated turning point for the com-
pletion of Belene NPP. On the one hand, the Communist Party was re-
moved from power in November 1990 and Bulgaria faced the new chal-
lenge of transitioning to a more open, transparent, and democratic state. 
On the other hand, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences warned the new 
government on the safety of Belene NPP from all perspectives. Environ-
mental as well as social, as well as economic concerns were raised in the 
“white book” published by Bulgarian scientists in 1990. The last concern, 
the economic one, was shared by the Bulgarian government which, facing a 
hard financial situation and having to deal with a changing world, decided 
to put the project on hold. Furthermore, the extended six-module project 
was downsized to a two-module one. The environmentally-concerned 
groups that were most active, like Ekoglasnost, regarded this as a victory 
for the new democratic course.
The Nineties were a decade of adjustment for Bulgarian politics and eco-
nomics, in light of the prospective accession to the European Union. In 
order to meet EU security standards, Sofia was forced to dismantle older 
reactors at Kozloduy before membership could be granted. By doing so, 
Bulgaria’s primary energy supply dropped, increasing the country’s de-
pendence on foreign resources. This condition prompted the National 
Movement Simeon II, the governing party led by the monarchic figure of 
Simeon Borisov Sakskoburggotski, to resume the nuclear plan in Belene. 
Prime Minister Sakskoburggotski and Energy Minister Milko Kovachev 
announced in 2003 that the project was to be restarted. 
The governmental announcement was followed by numerous audits by the 
EU and some supranational nuclear energy institutions (IEA, IAEA). This, 
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in turn, prompted new legislation and research on the environmental and 
economic impact of the construction of the NPP. Among other events, the 
establishment of the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) and the imple-
mentation of the Act for the Safe Use of Nuclear Energy in 2003-04 were 
the most significant political provisions.
In 2005, just before parliamentary elections, the National Electric Com-
pany (NEK) issued a tender to assign the design and the building tasks to 
the best bidder. As an indication of the direction taken by the new socialist 
government, the newly nominated Economy and Energy minister was a 
character closely connected with the Bulgarian nuclear industry, Ruman 
Ovcharov. Almost one year and a half after the announcement of the ten-
der, at the end of October 2006, the Russian consortium Atomstroyeksport-
Areva NP was assigned the job.  At the end of the year, the mandatory 
deadline for shutting down the third and fourth reactor in Kozloduy was 
met by Bulgaria, complying with European demands before being admitted 
to the EU in 2007.
The result of these rounds of political and diplomatic negotiations over the 
feasibility of the NPP in Belene was an intricate web of financial transac-
tions and declarations that harmed the overall international performance of 
Bulgarian markets. Russian banks involved in the investment were known 
for their ties with Gazprom (Gazprombank) and the Kremlin (Sberbank, 
Vneshekonombank, and VTB); international rating companies were un-
happy with the concentration of assets in the hands of the state-owned con-
sortium headed by NEK and downgraded the rank of Bulgarian financial 
performance and outlook.
In this respect, it is interesting to note that Bulgaria’s main partner has been 
and continues to be Russia. The path to diversification and emancipation 
from Russian hydrocarbons and nuclear fuel seems long and tortuous, as 
shown in the next paragraph. To date, the Belene project has been halted 
and the puzzle is far from being solved14.
3. Bulgaria’s Atomic Dependence on Russia 
The Russian Federation has had a political and commercial influence in 
Bulgaria’s atomic energy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By taking 
on its shoulders advantages and responsibilities as the ‘successor state’, Rus-
sia enjoyed a special relation with the former members of the Warsaw Pact 
14 The first draft of this paper considered updates until the first week of January 2012.
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through the supply of primary energy resources. Be it oil, natural gas or 
nuclear fuel, flows of energy commodities have been shipped to Eastern 
European countries, which have never been self-sufficient in terms of their 
energy endowment. Bulgaria is no exception to this trend, which has been 
enhanced after the turn of the century, with the creation of Russian energy 
conglomerates directly linked with the Kremlin. 
In the nuclear industry, Rosatom is the national company that inherited 
the role of the Ministry for Atomic Energy (MinAtom), established in 1992 
and reorganized in 2004. The then-president Vladimir Putin pushed for the 
‘state corporation’ in late 2007. Since then, Rosatom has been chaired by 
Abkhazian-born Sergei Kiriyenko15. Rosatom controls the stakes of Atom-
energoprom, a nuclear power holding that encompasses the whole Russian 
energy industry, as far as its civilian use is concerned. In the case of Bulgar-
ia, it seems important to take into account the role of two branches of the 
holding: the subsidiary OKB Gidropress and the partner company TVEL. 
Gidropress is a subsidiary of Rosatom providing infrastructural products 
for the construction of NPPs. Although its historic foundation goes back to 
194616, it has recently been given the role of subsidiary of Rosatom’s activi-
ties in the construction and maintenance of several NPPs both in Russia 
and abroad17. The 2006 Russo-Bulgarian deal on the prospective construc-
tion of the NPP in Belene envisioned Gidropress as the main contractor 
for the design, development, and maintenance of the plant. Since then, the 
Russian company has completed feasibility studies, the investment plan, 
and the safety provisions for the two VVER-1000 reactors. The project is 
laid out without a back-up plan in case the plant goes offline. Doubling 
Kozloduy’s 5.5 GW capacity and adding 1 GW from Varna coal and gas 
plant would put the whole system under stress, as it would be impossible to 
match any emergency shut down.
In 2002, TVEL won the bid to supply nuclear fuel to Bulgaria (OECD, 
2010:151). The tender assigned TVEL with the task of taking care of the 
entire life-cycle, from purchase to disposal, of the fuel used in Kozloduy 
power plant. Each year, the quantities and prices are re-negotiated. How-
15 Kirienko had briefly served as acting Prime Minister, during the economic crisis that prompted 
Yeltsin’s decision to substitute Yevgeni Primakov for Viktor Chernomyrdin. Kiriyenko worked closely 
with Putin since 2000 and entered the board of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency in 2005
16 The enterprise implements a complex of design, theoretical, analytical, R&D and production activities 
in reactor development for nuclear power plants of various purpose with increased safety, reliability and 
efficiency, competitive both in Russia and abroad.
17 Notably, the Iranian NPP at Bushehr os among Gidropress’ overseas projects.
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ever, in order to avoid risk of supply, the Bulgarian government signed an 
‘insurance’ with TVEL, which would avoid interruptions of supply until the 
expiration of the contract in 2020.
The demand for enriched uranium was substantial, provided that the plant 
in Kozloduy was still two-thirds operational and that the NPP in Belene 
was under construction. Bulgaria had an important history in uranium 
mining since the late Fifties. Mines were found in the Thirties and pro-
duced a significant amount of average-quality uranium that was purified in 
the ‘Zvezda’ plant and shipped to other Eastern Bloc countries to be pro-
cessed before entering the industrial production. With the governmental 
decree Nr. 163 (August 20, 1992), all uranium production and processing 
activities were abandoned in Bulgaria and the country preferred to rely on 
foreign supply. The total cost for decommissioning all existing facilities and 
for the reconversion of the industrial activity was calculated by the Minis-
try of Finance to be larger than BGN 35 millions in the period spanning 
from 1992 to 2008. 
Since decommissioning the mines, Bulgaria lost its market power in the 
bartering of uranium for nuclear fuel, a trend that had slowed down af-
ter the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Bulgaria imports recycled 
nuclear fuel from Russian NPPs and ships back Kozloduy’s spent fuel at 
an additional cost for disposal. Such practice has triggered economic and 
environmental concern over the long-term sustainability of the costs and 
externalities related to Russian recycled fuel rods. All in all, it seems of little 
consolation for Bulgaria’s energy to transfer its dependence on Russian hy-
drocarbons to Russian nuclear fuel, which defeats the whole purpose of the 
diversification effort that could lead to the energy emancipation of Sofia.
nuclEar EnErgy and thE accEssion of Bulgaria to thE Eu
1. Meeting Brussels’ Requirements 
The diplomatic dialogue between Sofia and Brussels began on 30 March 
1998, within the process involving all Central and Eastern European coun-
tries bidding to access the EU. The formal negotiations for accession were 
started on 15 February 2000 and were concluded on 15 June 2004. The 
Treaty of accession was signed on 25 April 2005. Bulgaria joined EU on 1 
January 2007, together with Romania. This was the last step of the greater 
EU enlargement process which involved 12 countries, nine of which for-
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merly under the Soviet orbit, thus establishing new Eastern borders for the 
Union (Smilov, 2006). 
The EU approach to the Bulgarian accession was peculiar: membership was de-
layed and the observer-state status persisted after Sofia’s formal accession (Gat-
eva, 2010), as confirmed by the establishment of the Control and Verification 
Mechanism (CVM). Because of Bulgaria’s fiscal and budgetary conditions, the 
requirements for the accession were stricter than for other CEECs newcomers. 
It could be considered ‘either the last to benefit from the old enlargement poli-
cies or the first to experience the novel and more restrictive stance of the EU to 
the admission of new member States’ (Smilov, 2006). Brussels’ way reinforces 
the idea of a Bulgarian specificity among Eastern European countries. 
Even if, ‘the objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members of 
European Union in 2007’18, as declared at the Copenhagen Summit. The 
main obstacles to full membership regard the lack of a functioning market 
economy able to afford European pressure and the difficulties to close all 
the chapters of the acquis. In 2002, the Progress Report stated: ‘Bulgaria still 
needs to make sustained efforts to develop sufficient administrative and 
judicial capacity to implement and enforce the acquis’19. For this reason, the 
EU Commission prepared a detailed roadmap, indicating the 28 chapters 
of the acquis and the actions to take in order to fulfill every requirement.
Energy conditions. The chapter of the acquis dedicated to energy distin-
guishes between short and medium term objectives in order to align Bulgar-
ian energy policy and legislation to EU standards. The short term requests 
regarded the implementation of necessary reform to liberalise natural gas 
and electricity markets, following the reform of all EU member States. The 
nuclear sector was the principal addressee of indications in the ‘Roadmap 
to EU accession’. In fact, recommendations reported in the Council Report 
on Nuclear Safety (June 2001) and confirmed in the Peer Review Status 
Report (June 2002) regarded the closure of units 1 and 2 of Kozloduy plant, 
perceived as urgent measure to adopt. The closure of units 3 and 4 of the 
same plant and the compliance with Euratom requirements and procedure. 
Nuclear issue and two level game. The conditions posed about nuclear issue 
could be considered as a two-level game (Putnam, 1988), in order to under-
stand the terms of accession negotiations and taking into account both the 
International/European dimension and the national one. 
18 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen EU Council.
19 Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament 
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International level. In July 1992, G-7 summit decided Soviet-era nuclear 
reactor were not safe according to international standards20. As conse-
quence, the VVER 440/230 technology was labeled as ‘high risk’ and ‘not 
upgradable’ at reasonable costs. This attitude was a Chernobyl spill-over ef-
fect (Kahn, 2007; Panova, 2010). In 1993, Bulgaria signed a Nuclear Safety 
Account Agreement (NSAA) with European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) which assured the closure of units 1-2 by 1997 and 
3-4 by 1998. The decommissioning operations were supported by a fund 
of ECU 24 million21. A first crisis about nuclear issues emerged in October 
1995, when Bulgarian authorities decided to reconnect Kozloduy unit 1, af-
ter the periodical shutdown for maintenance. The international community 
perceived the decision as a temptation to ignore previous agreements. The 
first reaction arrived from EC Parliament through a resolution appealing 
for the immediate closure of unit 1, according to NSA Agreement. In the 
fall of 1995, the two actors reached an agreement to carry further tests of 
safety standards. The result was quite contradictory. At first it was decided 
to restart the unit 1 and the EU allocated additional ECU 10.9 million to 
finance a further upgrade and the eventual conversion into thermal plant. 
In May 1996, Kozloduy was shut down to allow new tests. The Kurchatov 
Institute in Moscow declared the unit to comply with safety standards. In 
January 1997, the unit was reconnected to the grid. Moreover, in its Short 
Term Programme, Nek planned the life extension of the units. As confirmed 
by the State Energy Committee the units 1-4 remained in service until 2004 
and 2005, when the modernisation of units 5 and 6 was due to be completed. 
European level. Since the beginning of negotiations, nuclear energy entered 
in EU-Bulgaria dialogue. In July 1997, when Agenda 200022 was defined, the 
Commission stressed the need to obtain a realistic programme for Bulgaria 
to face nuclear safety issue, including the possibility of closing. After the 
meeting, Bulgaria didn’t enter into the group of six countries considered 
ready to access to EU. In this case, nuclear was only a marginal matter, be-
sides economic and budgetary difficulties.
20 After the summit, the National representatives declared: ‘While we recognize the important role 
nuclear power plays in global energy supplies, the safety of Soviet design nuclear power plants gives 
cause for great concern. Each State, through its safety authorities and plant operators, is itself responsible 
for the safety of its nuclear power plants. The new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must give high priority to eliminating this danger. These 
efforts should be part of a market-oriented reform of energy policies encouraging commercial financing 
for the development of the energy sector’.
21 This fund was added to ECU 11.5 million received within the PHARE programme in 1991.
22 [COM (97), 2000]. ‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union’ is a Commission Communication 
which launched a single complete framework offering a clear and coherent vision of European Union, 
whose aim was to ready the Union for the reinforcement of its policies and the accession of new 
members, within a strict financial framework.
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Despite this, in 1998 nuclear affair officially entered in the negotiations. The 
EU-Bulgaria Accession Partnership indicated nuclear safety and Kozloduy 
closure as short term objectives. After ambiguous debates, the final agree-
ment decided the closure of units 1 and 2 by 2003, in exchange of additional 
financial support and the closure of units 3 and 4 by 2006. From EU side, 
the importance of nuclear issue was related to energy security, more than 
environmental worries: nuclear affairs were included in the Chapter 14 of 
the acquis23. As officially stated, the main aims of the requirement were to 
‘ensure the safety for nuclear power plants in order that electricity is pro-
duced according to a high level of nuclear safety and . . .  [to] ensure that 
nuclear waste is handled in a responsible manner and prepare for the im-
plementation of Euratom safeguards on nuclear material’. Bulgaria closed 
the Energy chapter with the other candidates, except Romania24.  
National level.  The compliance with international and EU requirements 
was not easy. Only in November 2002, just before the Copenhagen sum-
mit25, Bulgarian authorities accepted the closure and received the further 
pre-accession financial aid package of $1.5 billion. However, the acceptance 
was not total both at European and national level. 
The declaration of the Prime Minister, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha26, provoked a 
general opposition. At national level, the closure was the object of a refer-
endum request. In early 2002, the fear of economic and energy shutdown 
pushed to the demand for a referendum about the closure of the units27. 
One of the most challenging issue was the discussion about the closure of 
units 3 and 4. The Bulgarian government tried to renegotiate it, due to in-
ternal opposition and the risk of spreading anti-European feelings. Before 
the visit of President Parvanov to Brussels, the Parliament approved the 
proposal by NDSV and DPS to define the date of closure of units 3 and 
23 The chapter concerning the alignment between EU energy policy and legislation for the internal 
market.
24 See at:  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/
negotiations/eu10_bulgaria_romania/chapters/chap_14_en.htm
25 The historical Summit held in Copenhagen closed the first part of the EU enlargement: ten CEECs 
closed the negotiations to join European Union by 1 May 2004. 
26 Saxe-Coburg Gotha became Prime Minister on 21 July 2001. His government was supported by 
NMSII, MRF and BSP. In November 2002, this government coalition survived to two “no confidence” 
votes promoted by UDF and Coalition for Bulgaria, against the signature of the agreement with EU for 
the decommissioning of Kozloduy.
27 In December 2002, the Socialist Party called for a referendum, whose request was deposited in June 
2004. In April 2005, also the Kozloduy Civic Committee announced the intention of a referendum. In 
April 2005, the Treaty to accession was signed in Luxembourg.
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4 upon a few conditions: the date of accession to EU, an equal treatment 
with Lithuania and Slovakia and advantaged economic treatment. Bulgaria 
requested a new peer review in order to demonstrate the optimal condi-
tions of nuclear safety for units 3 and 4. According to the national posi-
tion, from a technological perspective, the two units had been upgraded. 
In 2003 an inquiry carried out by 18 international inspectors demonstrat-
ed that the two units meet all necessary international standards. Bulgaria 
aimed to obtain a delay until 2011 and 2013 for the permanent shutdown, 
in order to complete the modernization of the remaining units: 5 and 6 
(VVER 1000/320) needed for improvement. As underlined by the Presi-
dent of Council, Juncker, the signature closed the possibility of changing 
the Treaty contents. In May 2005, the Bulgarian Parliament ratified the Ac-
cession Treaty with 231 favorable votes and one contrary. While signing the 
decree, President Parvanov admitted the Kozloduy closure was the most 
relevant concession the country had had to make to EU, but the ratification 
of Treaty closed the issue. 
2. Nuclear Energy and the Current Situation
After the Fukushima accident on 11 March 2011, the European Commission 
has required a re-assessment of all nuclear plants. As decided at the meet-
ing on 23 June 2011 with Energy Commissioner Oettinger all EU countries 
agreed to undertake voluntary comprehensive risk and safety assessment 
(stress-test), taking into account the indications released by EC and Euro-
pean Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) on 24 May 2011. Con-
sequently, all nuclear plants have been re-assessed, according to EU wide 
criteria which consider both natural and man-made hazards. Concretely, 
the re-assessment consisted in an evaluation of the response of a NPP when 
facing a set of extreme conditions and in a verification of the preventive and 
mitigation measures, chosen according a ‘defence-in-depth logic’: initiating 
events, consequential loss of safety functions, and severe accident manage-
ment. The results were submitted to European Commission, whose aim is 
to check its fulfillment with EU standards by 31 December 2011. 
The Bulgarian report covers both Kozloduy and Belene, even if the Techni-
cal design documentation of Belene NPP has not been authorized by Nu-
clear Regulatory Agency. This choice emerges the willingness of confirm 
the high safety standards of the new plant against the fear of another nay. As 
specified by Bulgarian authorities, the reactor type selected for the second 
Bulgarian NPP in Belene is a pressurized water reactor VVER-1000 model 
B-466B, equipped with reliable third generation safety systems. In addition, 
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the design has been furnished with unique systems protecting the RPV 
from significant external influences, including air crash on the building. 
In 2010, nuclear energy accounted for 19% in the Bulgarian energy mix. 
The only operating power plant is located in Kozloduy and only two of the 
total installed 6 units are still active. The two operating reactors are licensed 
until 2017 and 2019 respectively, even if their lifetime is to be extended 
for another 20 years, after to the 2006 upgrade. Originally, nuclear power 
was to reduce dependency on Moscow hydrocarbon imports. However, as 
shown in Figure 3, this aim is unlikely to be reached. Despite the fulfillment 
of international safety standards, the ‘Fukushima effect’, and the new envi-
ronmental policy, it is possible to forecast a surge in nuclear energy by 2030.
Figure 3-nuclear Energy scenario (Mtoe)
Source: Elaboration on Bp Statistical Review, IEA and Eurostat, 2011
Bulgaria’s EnErgy in thE WidEr Black sEa rEgion: policy implications
1. The Policy Triangle: Sofia, Brussels, Moscow
Energy plays a central role in EU-Russia relations. As stated by the Com-
missioner Ferrero-Waldner ‘the equation is simple: we need Russia’s energy 
and Russia need the enormous energy market we provide’. It emerges the in-
terdependence between the two actors which pushed to the official Energy 
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Dialogue, launched at the summit held in Paris in October 2000. Accord-
ing to initial intentions, the main aim of this official instrument is to create 
a framework to reinforce energy cooperation through discussion mainly 
about energy efficiency measures and investments in infrastructures. A re-
alistic Energy Dialogue needs to be supported by a more general frame-
work, like a Partnership Agreement, in order to create a wider common 
economic space. Moreover, the effectiveness of the Energy Dialogue should 
be guaranteed by common rules. In this direction an essential issue is the 
ratification of Energy Chart, signed in 1994 by 51 countries except Rus-
sia, because of the acceptance of art. 7 about transit rules. The reluctance 
to ratify the document is explained by Russian President Medvedev, who 
affirmed: ‘Everyone knows about the so called Energy Charter, which was 
developed to a large extent with a view to protecting the interests of con-
sumers, which is not a bad thing. One should not forget, though, that sellers 
are equally parties in any contractual relations and their interests should 
also be protected to the same extent as interests of transit States’. Such stand 
permits Russia to adopt a divide et impera policy towards EU partners. The 
Sofia- Moscow relation is a typical case study. After the Bulgarian acces-
sion to EU, Sofia-Moscow nuclear relations remained unchanged. Further-
more, Bulgaria becomes a new window of opportunity for Russia to enter 
EU markets, especially due to the unsettled question of the Belene project 
and the uranium shipments for the Kozloduy plant. As a consequence, after 
2007 the EU dependence on Russian energy increased, altering the equa-
tion depicted by Ferrero Waldner in favour of Russian interests.
On the one hand, the EU lacks a common energy policy due to the strong 
national interests of its members. On the other hand, Russia pulls apart its 
Western customers by enjoying special relations with former Soviet satel-
lites – thanks to the already-in-place pipeline network – and pursuing bi-
lateral negotiations in each energy-related ventures. The resulting scenario 
with these two distinct poles of attraction is that Bulgaria is the one player 
with the power to situate itself in the game last. The advantage of the last 
move allows for a strategic leeway that Sofia could well enjoy amidst such 
giants pulling her skirt.
Bulgaria lays as a strategic cornerstone between East and West, North and 
South. Once the Soviet outpost closest to the Balkans, Greece, and Turkey, 
it now represents a key country in the wider Black Sea region. The accession 
to the EU has marked an important step towards the positioning of Sofia 
in the long run within this geopolitical context. The EU membership and 
the relative communitarian requirements let Bulgaria jump forward in the 
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context of the Western European bloc. The concept of bloc here is smoother 
and softer than what has been regarded a secluded and militarized ensem-
ble of sovereign countries prior to the fall of the Berlin wall. The EU bloc 
sets post-1991 economic, legal, and social norms that aim at creating har-
mony among member states, possibly building stronger-than-international 
bonds between a community of sovereign subjects. Bulgaria’s choice was 
ineluctable in that its resistance from a rapprochement with Russia was 
at the basis of the post-Warsaw Pact world. Unwilling to look East, Sofia 
chose to come closer to the rising power of Brussels. However, the lack of 
transparency and the slow socioeconomic transition process rendered the 
emancipation of Sofia from its strong links to Russia much more problem-
atic. The double-edged connection between Russian and Bulgarian politi-
cians and both countries’ corporations, especially in the energy industry, 
grew just as much as Sofia’s declarations of commitment to EU principles. 
In this last part of the paper, we seek to understand what could be the les-
son that history teaches for the Bulgarian energy sector in its implication 
for the regional and international contexts.
Ameliorating the situation could be easy on Sofia in this desolate environ-
ment of energy dependence and inefficiency. However, a necessary effort 
must be undertaken by the Bulgarian leadership in order to keep decision-
making secure against corruption. It is widely felt among Bulgarian and in-
ternational analysts, environmental activists, members of the academic and 
research world, that some among the highest ranking figures in the Bulgar-
ian governments are unable to push forward independent actions for the 
good of the Bulgarian society, without resorting to the pursuit of personal 
gains in cahoots with Russian peers. To set a distance from the allegations, 
the best answer from Bulgarian officials would be a shift in policymaking 
towards more transparent, coherent, and responsible endeavors.
2. Prospects for Bulgaria
The prospective construction of a new nuclear power plant in Belene seems 
to have little significance in a framework of energy issues that might well 
yield more stringent implications for Bulgaria. Several pipeline projects are 
being put in line, built, or studied for both natural gas and oil. Important 
investments are being channeled to the renewable energy sector, which 
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is seeing a steady increase in its market share28. However, the costly new 
technologies might not impact the sector significantly for the next decade. 
Natural gas, be it from the Caspian, from underground shale rocks, or in its 
liquified form, could be the healing potion for Bulgaria’s short term energy 
needs.
For the reasons stated above, energy in Bulgaria is a very rigid segment of 
the economy. Long term commitments are needed for developing all the 
different sources that would satisfy the internal demand and would allay 
the dependency from Russia. Bulgaria finds herself in the position of hav-
ing a whole set of opportunities at her reach. Low carbon emissions will 
not be worsened by the new lignite plants that are being built, and might 
possibly reach lower levels once older coal-fired plants are replaced by gas-
fired ones. Bulgaria’s energy intensity is very high, in that every Lev of GDP 
costs a higher amount of energy than the European average. 
However, energy can also be the source of new opportunities for Bulgaria, 
especially in the regional setting. By exploiting the favorable geopolitical 
factor, Sofia can become a leading force in the region. Bulgaria is in fact 
at the cultural, social, and economic centers of the area stretching from 
the former-Yugoslavian countries, along with Central and Eastern Europe, 
Greece and Turkey, out to the wider Black Sea region, which includes Slavic 
and Caucasian former Soviet states. Cooperation in the energy sector can 
yield favorable results in terms of overall cooperation in the region due 
to long term binding commitments, a reliable legal frameworks, and the 
set up of an interdependent web of relations. Such energy spill-over might 
prove the only compelling force for these countries to come together for a 
new season of cooperation, especially within the overlapping set of political 
associations in which the considered countries participate.
conclusion
The present paper provides an analysis of the Bulgarian nuclear energy sec-
tor through an innovative and multidisciplinary path. Utilising the histori-
cal institutionalism as theoretical framework, we tried to understand the 
28 In this paper we focused mainly on the nuclear aspect of the ‘policy triangle’ between Sofia, Moscow, 
and Brussels. However, we kept in mind the relevance of other aspects of Bulgarian energy that are 
tough to unbundle. At the end of 2011, the Burgas-Alexandroupoulos oil pipeline project was turned 
down by the Bulgarian administration, creating a rough diplomatic exchange between Moscow and 
Sofia to determine who had to pay for the missed opportunity. Furthermore, Russia keeps a strong 
foothold on Bulgarian oil in that Russian companies – chiefly LUKoil – own all Bulgarian refineries. The 
little role played by the EU is fundemental in understanding what daily worries policy makers in Sofia.
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trend in Bulgaria’s policy choices Bulgaria in order to define its current pol-
icy options as part of the triangle with the EU and the Russian Federation. 
The international and European institutions on the one hand and the Rus-
sian foreign political and economic pressure on the other are the strong-
est forces on the Bulgarian stage. Within this context, the issue of nuclear 
energy puts at stake the sheer independence of Sofia from such forces and 
its internal and regional legitimacy. 
From a methological point of view, data analysis on Bulgarian energy mix 
is combined with the history of the nuclear sector. Such approach allows 
us to look at the history of Bulgaria’s international relations with Russia 
and institutional relations with the EU from a more mundane perspective. 
Through the analysis of Brussels’ requirements and Moscow’s activity in 
the Bulgarian nuclear sector we could single out political decisions that 
were driven by energy constraints – such as the delay in the construction of 
the planned nuclear power plant in Belene. Once such causal relationships 
were outlined, we went forward displaying the policy options available to 
Sofia and the likely consequences that each would trigger. 
The analysis leads us to conclude that energy informs the political dynam-
ics among countries to a relevant extent, whose comprehension requires a 
multidisciplinary endeavour.
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